Scientists of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine joined the project “Investigation of the impact of the war against Ukraine on the socio-political transformation of the Russian Federation”, which was carried out by the NGO “Institute of Transformation of Northern Eurasia” with the financial support of the International Renaissance Foundation. Based on the results of the research, the popular science book “Feigned Russia: Imitation of Greatness and Power” was published.

On April 3, 2024, the Ukrainian Crisis Media Center hosted a presentation of the results of the project “Investigation of the impact of the war against Ukraine on the socio-political transformation of the Russian Federation”, the results of which were recently published in the edition “Feigned Russia: Imitation of Greatness and Power”. It was prepared, among other things, by scientists of the Academy, namely, the Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and the Hrushevsky Institute of Ukrainian Archeography and Source Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.

During the presentation

The event was moderated by the project manager and scientific editor of the publication, Head of the Department of Political Institutes and Processes of the Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the NAS of Ukraine, Corresponding member of NAS of Ukraine Galyna Zelenko. In her introductory speech, she said that the presented research lasted about a year.

Corresponding member of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Galyna Zelenko

 “How did the idea of ​​this book come about – to analyze the real state of affairs in Russia? In 2022, Ukrainians were euphoric: we thought we were about to win, and Russia would collapse. Although it was clear to many that Russians had been preparing for war against us since at least 2010, when, in particular, they began to reform their army. So, it turned out that Ukraine has a very large deficit for the study of Russia. “We don’t really understand Russian identity and we don’t know what kind of political regime there is and what socio-political processes are taking place,” the scientist explained. – We started the preface to the book “Feigned Russia: Imitation of Greatness and Power” with the quote “Russia cannot be understood with the mind alone, No ordinary yardstick can span her greatness: Her soul is of a special kind – In Russia, one can only believe”, because these lines by Fyodor Tyutchev are actually such an ideal of Russia, which Russia itself exports and promotes in the world. This is the idea of ​​Russia as something completely incomprehensible and at the same time powerful, something that everyone should be afraid of.

Our team of authors came out as a collective team, each member of which analyzed certain issues depending on their specialization. The biggest problem while working on this topic was related to the empirical material. Of course, we did not use propagandistic Russian sources – we selected only scientific, scientific-analytical, scientific-journalistic texts. Probably hundreds of materials were processed in order to understand as much as possible from the words of the Russians themselves what is happening in them.

Our book is written in the popular science genre. First of all, because we do not pretend to have exhaustive knowledge about Russia. I will repeat that empirical data was insufficient for the full scientificity of our research. But here is the main thing: we tried to study the image of the real Russia. If you remember, Russia always called Ukraine a “failed state”. Based on the existing theoretical base and supplementing it, we propose to characterize Russia as a “failing state”. Why did Russia start a war against Ukraine? What she calls the “Ukrainian crisis” is actually a Russian crisis. The reason for this crisis is that Russia, as one of the biggest geopolitical players, has not found its place in the world after the collapse of the socialist camp. So in the process of building up Russia’s muscles, one could expect armed aggression from it. We tried to analyze what she wanted to get as a result of this conflict and what she got. We believe that she has brought herself to the state of “failing state”. Another thing is that Russia can degrade for a very, very long time, and an attentive reader will rightly say that it is not easier for Ukraine. I agree! But understanding what is happening in Russia is important for understanding how to be with us.”

Candidate of Political Sciences Oles Lisnychuk

Next, the moderator gave the floor to Candidate of Political Sciences Oles Lisnychuk, who, while working at the Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine in 2000–2019, researched financial and industrial groups and political regimes. For the book “Feigned Russia: Imitation of Greatness and Power” he analyzed the current political regime in Russia, its features and essential characteristics: “First, I aimed to assess what changes took place in the ruling regime of the country that started the largest war in Europe after the Second World War, how radicalized he was – precisely in the context of a full-scale invasion. However, during the work it became clear that without a wider and deeper context – historical, structural, ontological – it will be quite difficult to explain these nuances. Therefore, the section was supplemented with new plots and partly even changed the starting idea. Everything in it is focused on the search for the most adequate, correct, accurate name for this regime, finding the name of evil that is no longer hidden.

In my opinion, the time of various constructions, which in one way or another are connected with certain transitional forms, for example, hybridity (“hybrid regime”, “hybrid war”), and to a large extent self-soothing – intellectually, politically, methodologically, theoretically – has passed. Now this evil has shown its true nature and face, so it needs a completely different identification. This is not just a terminological game: how we will see, define and explain the Russian political regime, its features and prospects, significantly depends on how we will perceive the main enemy force opposing Ukraine, the Western world, democracy in general, what our expectations will be regarding its transformation, evolution, strengthening, change, and ultimately replacement.

My conclusion: we, Ukrainians, faced a phenomenon that is now finally crystallizing – totalitarianism of a new period, a new time, a new type, neo-totalitarianism. Given the peculiarities of the modern era, I also call it postmodern totalitarianism. Obviously, this is a metaphor, an oxymoron, because the meaning of the postmodern era allegedly contradicts the idea of ​​totality, totalitarianism. However, this is the specificity of the Russian political regime: it was able to find opportunities to maximize control and violence, as well as to destroy competitive political and geopolitical forms. Perhaps his main feature is that he seeks and finds his strength in the application of tools of the postmodern era.

Of course, Russian totalitarianism differs from the totalitarian precedents of the 20th century. Let’s say, today in Russia it is not about ideological indoctrination, ideocracy. On the contrary, very different ideologues, different doctrines are borrowed there. These borrowings perform mainly an instrumental function – they serve to strengthen the regime itself and promote its pragmatic goals. Such a feature of previous totalitarian forms as the cult of personality also looks different. I took the liberty of asserting that the cult of Putin as a leader, the head of the country, is based in Russia on the so-called synthetic charisma, which does not correspond to the classical types or combinations known for regimes of this type. Actually, its basis is the use of technologies to influence mass consciousness and the political process. Propaganda and informational and psychological influence in Russia are aimed not only at their basic goals, but also at the construction of a new political and social reality. And this is also one of the methods of violence used by this regime. But the violence is not direct, not physical, but cultural, informational. Violence, for which there are simply no other alternatives, but a single vision is established. And in this way, for Vladimir Putin – a rather average character, a representative of one of the powerful corporations, which, admittedly, received sufficient power in the country – they created the image of an extremely wise ruler, a visionary, a combiner, a master of the political game both inside the country and on international level. One of the greatest achievements: those who were influenced accepted this cult, believed in it, made it a reality. In my opinion, this is both a characteristic feature and the Achilles heel of a new type of totalitarian regime. She personalizes it and makes it dependent on the physical existence of a person with the created charisma. Although Russian propaganda, as we can see, tries to multiply this essence, defeats the motive of the possibility of replacing Putin with some pseudo-Putin, etc. And this is also part of the political technology of postmodern Russian totalitarianism.

Another note: unlike the previous totalitarian forms that gained power and immediately radicalized, using the apparatus of violence, indoctrination, destroying enemies, Russian totalitarianism grew slowly, it strengthened and appeared in fact before our eyes, finally crystallized and radicalized already after a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. And this is also his vulnerable place. Why? We in Ukraine talk about the need to mobilize against the enemy militarily, economically, and socially. In Russia, in my opinion, the regime was mobilized first of all, and this mobilization works as long as it sets new tasks, as long as the ascending line of aggression is maintained. De-escalation can be a serious challenge for such a political regime. However, for now, we are still observing the birth of a new type of totalitarianism, without having complete and reliable information about it, so we can only speculate and make cautious predictions. It should also be taken into account that such a movement, such an evolution towards totalitarianism of a new type is possible not only in Russia. Obviously, this trend will significantly determine the great confrontation, which is sometimes called the Third (or the next) World War.”

Candidate of Historical Sciences, Iryna Pavlenko, Head of the Political System Department of the Center for Domestic Political Studies of the National Institute of Strategic Studies, commented on the process of formation and ideological design of the totalitarian regime, which many call racism: “I was a member of the Working Group on the preparation of the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on the condemnation of racism work analyzed how researchers evaluated fascism and Nazism. As a result, she identified 10 signs of a totalitarian regime, and all of them are present in modern Russia. Only Gulag is missing.”

Candidate of Historical Sciences Iryna Pavlenko

Another scientist of the Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine – leading researcher of the Department of Political Culture and Ideology, Candidate of Political Sciences Mykola Ryabchuk – prepared the section “Putin and Ukraine: the history of a painful obsession”. In this chapter, the author analyzed the genealogy of Russia’s “claims” to Ukraine and how Russia, which in 1991 was one of the first to recognize the state sovereignty of Ukraine, gradually moved from flexible forms of influence to a complete denial of Ukraine’s statehood and to armed aggression.

The leading researcher of the National Institute for Strategic Studies, Candidate of Political Sciences, Volodymyr Nagirniy, spoke about the largest domestic political changes in the Russian Federation: “Russia is positioning itself as a giant power that is regaining control over what it considers to be a natural space. It is absolutely sincerely anti-Ukrainian and close to setting the task of destroying Ukraine and Ukrainians as a vitally necessary goal for itself. This is a country that is waging a war and perceives it as, in particular, an existential one. Behind the facade created by the Russians, talking about “greatness, invincibility, power”, etc., processes are taking place that are quite difficult to analyze – due to the lack of empirical material, censorship and the completely understandable desire of Ukraine to distance itself from the Russian information space as a factor of destabilization. Nevertheless, many of these processes, especially at a more strategic level, are visible.”

Candidate of Political Sciences Volodymyr Nagirniy

According to the researcher, among the most significant of such processes, which have been activated in Russia over the past two years, was the change and then the leveling of the so-called “Putin’s social agreement”: “It is a basic unspoken social agreement for the Putin regime, the essence of which is in a simple formula: the government provides the population with a gradual, slow, but increase in the standard of living – in return, the population refuses any civic activity and interference in the affairs of the government, fully delegates to the government the resolution of issues of the national agenda. It was this agreement that was the basis of the internal policy of the Russian Federation and defined the consensus, in particular anti-Ukrainian, and later anti-Western. The process of changing this agreement began on the eve of the war and unilaterally – by the government, which gradually began to offer less to the population of Russia and demand more from it. And the population does not have the tools to oppose it, because there is no civil society, political movements and, in general, the skills of vertical competition. The vertical conflict between the bottom and the top is becoming more and more acute. Sooner or later, this will lead to crisis phenomena, in particular, related to the internal agenda, not external aggression.”

As Volodymyr Nagirniy emphasized, previous hopes for the liberalization and democratization of Russia have not come true and there is no social base for future structural changes in this direction either, but there is a demand (albeit not total) for competition and change of political elites. “Today, the main problem of Russia, from the point of view of internal processes, is the lack of a clear image of the future. Putin’s broadcast intimidation and claims to “greatness”, the status of the “fourth economy in the world” and one of the largest geopolitical centers, rather allow the regime to stay on the domestic plane, but they do not offer a model for the future. Because of this, sooner or later the regime will either have to be significantly transformed (which it is not capable of), or it will give way to something else (not least better and more convenient for us). But it definitely does not have a historical perspective beyond the physical lives of its key figures,” the scientist concluded.

Candidate of Historical Sciences Andriy Starodub

How a full-fledged federation is Russia – said the senior researcher of the Department of Foreign Sources on the History of Ukraine of the M.S. Hrushevsky Institute of Ukrainian Archeography and Source Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine Andriy Starodub, Candidate of Historical Sciences, who analyzed ethno-national processes in Russia: “I was attracted to this topic for several reasons. On the one hand, because, in view of my specialization, I studied the period of the first collapse of the Russian Empire (after World War I), due to my age, I remember the process of the disintegration of the Soviet Union well, and now I would like to – although, rather, not as a researcher – to check whether the humorous maxim “What happened once may not happen again, but what happened twice, will definitely happen a third time” will work.

Indeed, the current historical stage is characterized by certain signs of the previous two collapses of the Russian Empire. So, looking at the still rather hazy horizons and fragmentary data that we can extract from open sources, we have reason to assume that the third disintegration is not a matter of a long-term perspective, because one way or another it will already start as a result of the current war unleashed by Russia.

Is it possible to more or less accurately and in detail predict whether Russia will disintegrate into a certain number of states, or whether it will remain as some fragile federation/confederation? It is as difficult as, say, in 1913 it would be difficult to predict the new borders of Europe, which will be formed by the end of 1918. At the beginning of the 1980s and even in 1985, anyone who would have predicted the approach of earth-shattering changes and the emergence of new “unexpected” independent states would have been declared a floodlighter and a dreamer. Therefore, I would now also prefer to avoid too categorical conclusions and predictions. After all, Russia is really very multifaceted. Despite the unfamiliarity of the “matryoshka” for Russia (like many other inventions that this country once brazenly “borrowed” and appropriated), the image of the matryoshka is really what this state entity is. Now we can see only one of its shells, others can be seen only through the “cracks” in it. But they are there, and there are more of these internal “matryoshka dolls” than it seems at first glance.

Briefly about the main theses. First, everything that Russia tells about itself cannot really be trusted. Any statistical or other data from there by default should be questioned. For me, it was a paradoxical discovery that many Western researchers uncritically perceive official Russian information about the processes taking place in this country, in particular about the ethno-national composition, language skills, economic indicators, etc. However, manipulations in Russia already occur at the level of population censuses, and even more at the level of interpretation of the received data. This especially applies to regions that the Kremlin considers to be critically important for itself and that can really claim to self-reliance. A vivid example is the Republic of Tatarstan, the majority of whose population (52–53%) is the titular nation – Tatars. At the same time, the interpreters of the censuses try to divide this group as much as possible – for example, according to religion: into religious and non-religious Tatars, into Muslim Tatars and “Kryashen” Tatars (that is, converts to Orthodoxy, Christian Tatars), and so on. By the way, Russian propaganda works here side by side with the Russian opposition. At one time, a survey was conducted in Tatarstan by Navalny’s team and based on one indicator – the number of “practicing” Muslims there (those who regularly visit mosques), which turned out to be approximately 38% – made a surprising conclusion that there is no protest potential and demand for self-determination of the nation… So, I repeat, any data from Russia should be treated extremely critically.

Secondly, it is worth paying closer attention to the regions that are in the information “shadow”. Russia outwardly broadcasts that it is monolithic, and the friendship of peoples flourishes in it, but in reality the Russian authorities are afraid of disintegration and are actively preparing for it. This became especially noticeable after 2017-2018, when they began to cancel the study of national languages ​​and replace management personnel in the national republics. But no one has analyzed how successful this process is. Of course, it is still too early to draw conclusions – only 5-6 years have passed. But during this time, the All-Russian population census was held, and more than one sociological survey was conducted. It became clear that far from everywhere, the process moves as the central government intended. In this regard, Russia is quite colorful. For example, Russification is divided into monoethnic entities such as the Chechen Republic, the Republic of Tyva, and even polyethnic Dagestan. The mechanism of displacing national personnel also does not work. It is not about the fact that there are some managers from among representatives of indigenous peoples who are not loyal to Moscow – they are loyal everywhere. Some are grotesquely loyal. But Moscow is trying to replace even them as much as possible, so that in each of these republics there are at least ethnic Russians in the second and third positions. This was demonstrated, for example, by the replacement of prime ministers in Bashkortostan and Tatarstan.

Thirdly, for the foreign audience, Russia uses a modified concept of the “united Soviet people”, telling that there are no reasons for contradictions between the peoples who inhabit the Russian Federation. Nevertheless, there are “swept under the carpet” conflicts with Tatarstan and Chechnya regarding history textbooks. Moreover, recently, Chechnya demonstratively forced to rewrite the paragraphs related to the deportation of peoples during the Second World War. Although this is apparently a region loyal to the metropolis, where secondary officials are sometimes released to the public to assure that the Chechens have always dreamed of being the younger brothers of the Russians. But how can these statements be taken seriously? And in what way is it possible to reconcile the history of Chechnya with the history of Russia? Under any serious disturbances, all this pretend, grotesque loyalty will be quickly discarded and completely different processes will begin.

Finally, the last thing: data distortions give a wrong idea not only about national minorities in the Russian Federation, but also about Russians. For example, according to the latest population census, 80% of those who indicated their nationality consider themselves Russian. At the same time, the total number of ethnic Russians is steadily decreasing. The difference between the indicators of their number in the Russian Federation according to two censuses is almost 6 million people. That is, Russians are a dying people. The authorities are trying their best to add residents of the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories to the total number of ethnic Russians. In addition, in some places in Russia, the inertia of assimilation processes is still great. This can be seen most clearly in the example of the Chuvash people, a numerically rather large people (more than a million people). But their number is noticeably decreasing from year to year due to the fact that many choose Russian identity. But this is no longer available almost anywhere. That is, Russia has already exhausted the resources for “depreciation” of demographic losses among ethnic Russians. Modern labor migrants to the Russian Federation from the republics of Central Asia no longer wish to assimilate (as was the case in the times of the USSR) and identify themselves as Russians.

My general conclusion is as follows: our task now is to carefully look at everything that is happening in Russia. Rationally and critically evaluate all, even the smallest, “signals” about troubles inside the “matryoshka”. Do not nurture unnecessary illusions, do not pass off wishful thinking, but also do not fold your hands pessimistically because, as it seems to us, there are no strong national movements and national leaders in Russia. Still to come: All empires eventually fall.

Galyna Zelenko also spoke about the section she was preparing: “I called it “World Order Z”. Why such a journalistic name? In 2022, the magazine “Russia in Global Politics” published an article of the same name “World Order Z”, which talked about “peace, friendship, traditional values” and so on. She prompted me to analyze what Russia actually achieved by starting a war against Ukraine. After all, in order to understand how to act, one must also understand what Russia wants. It is clear that the war against Ukraine is not exactly a story about Ukraine. “Demilitarization”, “denazification” are just figures of speech. Russia uses them for internal use and to justify itself in front of the so-called “global South”. In fact, it is an attempt to change the rules of the game. Russia is trying to be one of the most important geopolitical players, but it does not have modern resources either for waging war or for decent competition, it cannot offer an attractive socio-political model, the latest technologies, etc. At the beginning of 2022, already during the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, Forbes magazine published a ranking of the world’s 500 largest companies, among which there was not a single Russian company. At the same time, experts in political science considered Russia to be one of the five most sovereign states in the world, that is, states that have the highest level of political and national sovereignty (of course, all this is relative, because in the conditions of globalization it is impossible to remain completely sovereign).

What happened when Russia launched a major war against Ukraine in order to regain the geopolitical weight, control over certain territories and resources of influence that it possessed in 2014? Russian analysts themselves (in particular, within the Valdai discussion club) openly wrote and said that Ukraine is a tool of Russia to put pressure on the West, to intimidate the West. Shortly before a full-scale invasion, in late 2021, Russia effectively issued NATO an ultimatum, demanding a return to the status quo of 1997, before the Alliance expanded eastward. Probably, it was planned that with the beginning of full-scale military aggression, the West would cede Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. At least Russia believed that it had all the tools of influence, so that the West, not that it did not want to, but was unable to apply the amount of sanctions that it, in the end, applied, because Europe was significantly dependent on Russian energy carriers. Obviously, there were miscalculations on both sides. According to formal indicators (say, the level of GDP), the Russian Federation allegedly overcame the sanctions, and its economic decline was not as rapid as predicted (2%, not 10%, as predicted by the International Monetary Fund). But in fact, Russia is currently experiencing a colossal simplification of the economy. From the point of view of quality, regression is very big. Due to Western, as well as its own, mirror sanctions, Russia, limited in the purchase of the latest equipment, which is sold complete with maintenance, must gradually abandon the development of high-tech industries, as well as ambitions to develop the Arctic and space. And without these attributes, the status of a superpower, a major geopolitical player, is lost. Russians now talk a lot about reorientation to the markets of the global South, in particular to Asia (they say, “all the money in the world is now being made in Asia”), however, according to the calculations of the newspaper “The Wall Street Journal”, by the middle of 2023, the Russian share in Chinese imports will be only 3.9%, while Chinese in Russian is about 50%. That is, Russia drove itself into a dead end and became dependent on other states. In fact, it handed over its political sovereignty to China with its own hands and continues to drag this mess on itself. That is why we decided to apply the phrase “failing state” to it, which already existed in political science.” However, it is methodologically correct to compare not Russia and Ukraine, but Russia and countries that have similar claims to the role of world leader. And here, according to all indicators, the Russian Federation loses significantly and, against their background, it really looks like a country that is degrading. In fact, the Russian Federation is now fighting for those tools of influence in the world that it had as of 2014, but already under the pressure of sanctions and with irreversible reputational losses.

The presentation was followed by a session of questions, answers and comments from the guests of the event

Answering a question, Andriy Starodub compared the current Russian-Ukrainian war with the First World War: “I would draw two parallels. First of all, both then and now, all parties involved in the conflict inadequately assessed their own forces and the forces of their opponents. In 1914, no one predicted that the war would last so long. It was about the standards, relatively speaking, of the usual wars of that time, such as the Balkan wars. They hoped that in a year, at most in two years, everyone would come to an agreement and the war would end. But it turned out the way it did. Now, too, there are signs that all the explicit and implicit sides of the conflict were not ready for it – in the sense that they had no idea how many resources would be needed, nor what the other side could do.

There is also a second parallel (we’ll see if it comes true): possible surprises to who will win and lose in the current war. After all, Russia entered the First World War with the bloc that ultimately won, but as a result of the war, it not only did not gain anything, but also lost it.”

Galyna Zelenko expressed her opinion on whether the disintegration of Russia is possible in the foreseeable future. “Russia has done everything to remove itself from the cohort of the largest geopolitical players. Can she build muscle and make a comeback? So far, I have my doubts, says the scientist. – As for its possible disintegration, the prerequisites for this are not sufficient at the moment. Firstly, due to the large territory and at the same time almost the lowest population density (8 people per 1 square kilometer). This is not enough for the development of socio-political processes in the regions. Secondly, the subjects of the federation have no experience of independent and democratic existence. Thirdly, Russia has no neighboring countries that would have a common identity with it and would clearly claim its territory. The territorial claims of Japan and other countries are not critical. Fourthly, all large Russian business is subordinate to the Kremlin, and therefore even if one of its owners wanted to support national liberation movements, they have no means to do so. Yes, the war against Ukraine is very unprofitable for Russia, from the point of view of the future and geopolitical processes in general. Of course, this does not make it easier for us, there are no fewer missiles flying at us, the Russians are not killing fewer of our people… Russia’s current war against Ukraine and the confrontation with the West is a complex and non-linear conflict, the aggravation of which significantly depends on the processes in the global South, where, in my opinion, Russia is losing ground. And yet there is not enough data to predict the development of events. This is an equation with many unknowns and high multivariate solutions. But, taking into account the previous history, the most likely change in the political situation in Russia (in particular, the political regime) can take place through abdication, that is, a momentary break (for example, a palace coup).”

“As a historian, in my chapter of the book, I singled out a set of factors by which you can try to “measure” the readiness of certain regions of the Russian Federation for secession. But there are at least two problems here, – notes Andriy Starodub. – First, the list of these factors cannot be exhaustive. In order for any of the subjects of the federation to wish to become independent, neither cultural distance nor the short duration of the conquest is enough. Theoretically, the Republic of Tiwa can restore its statehood, which was violently abolished in 1944, with one decision of the parliament. But this does not mean that this will happen. Tiwa is mono-ethnic, terribly far from Russia both culturally and in terms of historical memory, but at the same time it is isolated, poor and an object of Chinese interest. In fact, statehood is ready in Chechnya, no matter how you treat it. However, I emphasize that the possession of a national language or the presence of a national elite may not be decisive factors. Secondly, and this is often forgotten, we are predicting what will naturally happen to Russian regions if a parade of sovereignties suddenly begins in Russia. How will large regions act? Will there not be projects like the Ural Republic? All this is very difficult to calculate.”

Commenting on the presentation, the leading researcher of the Department of Political Institutes and Processes of the Kuras Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies of the NAS of Ukraine, Candidate of Political Sciences Rostyslav Balaban noted the importance of the new work: “The title of the book – “Feigned Russia…” – seems to me very successful, because the real Russia really does not correspond to the ideas about it. Ukrainian society and politicians, as well as Europeans, should understand this. In my opinion, terms that more adequately describe the Russian political system, which is characterized by political banditry, the customs of the criminal world, and the expansion of the territory on the model of Horde conquest, should be introduced into political science circulation. It doesn’t matter if this formation collapses or not, but researchers have an extremely responsible mission – to change the perception of Russia by showing its realities.”

According to the press service of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine

and the Ukrainian Crisis Media Center

Photo: Ukrainian Crisis Media Center

Notice of the presentation on the website of the Ukrainian Crisis Media Center

The electronic version of the book “Feigned Russia: Imitation of Greatness and Power”